



AUTOMATED MOBILE MALWARE CLASSIFICATION

zynamics GmbH

Status Quo: Mobile Malware




- The deluge of mobile malware that was predicted has not happened yet




Data source: F-Secure

Status Quo: Mobile Malware



- This does not mean that mobile malware is not a threat
- More money moving through GSM means more incentive to build malware
- Result: There WERE and WILL be outbreaks

News Item



January 21st, 2009

New mobile malware silently transfers account credit

Posted by Dancho Danchev @ 2:39 pm

Categories: [Anti Virus](#), [Hackers](#), [Malware](#), [Mobile \(In\)Security](#)

Tags: [Security](#), [Symbian](#), [Mobile Malware](#), [SMS Python Flocker](#), [Fraud.....](#)



17 TalkBacks

ADD YOUR OPINION



SHARE



PRINT




E-MAIL



+31


WORTHWHILE?

35 VOTES




Kaspersky Lab today warned users of five newly found variants of the Trojan-SMS.Python.Flocker mobile malware, targeting an Indonesian mobile provider's service allowing users to transfer money or minutes to each other's accounts. SMS Python Flocker is a known mobile malware family, whose previous versions used to automatically send SMS message from the infected mobile device to premium-rate numbers operated by the malware authors.

Problem: Variants




- A lot of filtering can be done using MD5
 - ▣ But: Fraudsters learned to obfuscate
- Variants are easy to create
- In the Windows world:
 - ▣ 20k MD5-different variants of the same malware
each month

Problem: Variants




- Ways to determine whether a file is a variant of a known malware are needed. Preferably:
 - Fast
 - Cheap
 - Reliable
 - Easily adapted to future threats

Current approach




- Analysis is
 - ▣ Not done at all
 - ▣ Done manually by a security expert
 - ▣ Done in some ad-hoc automated fashion

Problem: Variants




- Manual approaches do not satisfy our requirements:
 - Fast: No
 - Cheap: No
 - Reliable: Depends on the guy
 - Easily adaptable: Depends on the guy

Program Comparison




- How would we check if a file is a variant ?
- Program comparison tools are needed
- Surprise: We have built some
 - ▣ In use in the ITSec and AV world since 2004
 - ▣ „Best Paper“ at SSTIC 2005
 - ▣ Germany's biggest privately funded research prize 2006
 - We beat Siemens and T-Systems

Program Comparison



- Core principle: Comparison is **structural**
- Instructions may change a lot, the program structure **only slightly**
- Graphs are generated from the programs
- Comparison happens on these graphs

Status Quo: The Windows World



238ca336	push	ebp	000585a3	push	ebp
238ca337	mov	ebp, esp	000585a4	mov	ebp, esp
238ca339	push	ecx	000585a6	sub	esp, 18h
238ca33a	mov	eax, [ebp+8]	000585a9	mov	eax, [ebp+8]
238ca33d	and	dword ptr [ebp-4], 0	000585ac	mov	eax, [eax+14h]
238ca341	push	ebx	000585af	mov	[ebp-10h], eax
238ca342	mov	ebx, [eax+14h]	000585b2	mov	dword ptr [ebp-0Ch], 0
238ca345	push	esi	000585b9	mov	eax, [ebp-10h]
238ca346	push	edi	000585bc	add	eax, 0DCh
238ca347	lea	edi, [ebx+0DCh]	000585c1	mov	[ebp-8], eax
238ca34d	jmp	short loc_238CA39B	000585c4	jmp	loc_5864F
238ca34f	push	dword ptr [esi+4]	000585c9	mov	eax, [ebp-4]
238ca352	call	sub_23808D3C	000585cc	mov	eax, [eax+4]
238ca357	test	byte ptr [eax], 10h	000585cf	mov	[esp], eax
238ca35a	pop	ecx	000585d2	call	js_GetGCThingFlags
238ca35b	jz	short loc_238CA361	000585d7	movzx	eax, byte ptr [eax]
			000585da	movzx	eax, al
			000585dd	and	eax, 10h
			000585e0	test	eax, eax
			000585e2	jz	short loc_585EC
238ca35d	mov	edi, esi	000585e4	mov	eax, [ebp-4]
238ca35f	jmp	short loc_238CA39B	000585e7	mov	[ebp-8], eax
			000585ea	jmp	short loc_5864F



Search

Regular Expression Case sensitive

Flowgraph Assembler




sub_238CA336_5481




FindAndMarkObjectsToClose


primary



secondary




Program Comparison




- Our comparison is strong because ...
 - ▣ The entire program is taken into consideration
 - ▣ Recompiling does not fool us
 - ▣ Stable parts are identified
 - ▣ Large changes do not matter much

VxClass for Mobile Malware



- VxClass compares executables
- A library of known malware is kept
- New executables can be checked if they are **similar** to existing malware
- Easy to use, Reliable, Cheap

Case Study



- Unknown executable is received
- MD5 does not match anything
- Is it a variant of an existing piece of malware ?



Upload

Unpacking

Classification

Statistics

Executable Image Selection

Executable

"C:\@@\unknown_ex"

Description

Unknown executable first observed on
2nd of February, 2009 at Galapagos

Executable Image Options

Max Ticks (?)

500000000

Keep in the database



Unpack executable (?)



Classify executable (?)



IDB / IDA Database (?)



Symbian SIS package (?)



Upload

Upload Item



Upload

Unpacking

Classification

Statistics

Families Files Tree

Item Id Sort direction: Descending Show 25 items per page

Enter your filter expression here (?) Refresh

- Item Id
- Item Name
- Item Description
- State
- Family Name
- Family Description
- MD5 Hash
- SHA1 Hash
- SHA256 Hash
- SHA512 Hash
- Packer Name
- Packer Description
- PE Dump
- Warnings
- PE State
- User
- Maximum steps
- Time Added
- Unpacking Started On
- Unpacking Finished On
- Unpacking Time
- Analysis Started On
- Analysis Finished On
- Analysis Time
- Classification Started On
- Classification Finished On
- Classification Time

previous 1 of 7 next

Download EXE Download Dump Examine Dump Download IDB Delete selected

<input type="checkbox"/>	Item Id	Item Name	Item Description	State	PE State	Time Added
<input type="checkbox"/>	Edit 160	unknown_executable.sis->'.flo.mdl'		Analysis successful	Valid	2009-02-02 16:52:56
<input type="checkbox"/>	Edit 159	unknown_executable.sis->'.ni.ai.app'		Classifying	Valid	2009-02-02 16:52:56
<input type="checkbox"/>	Edit 158	unknown_executable.sis		<i>Analysis failed</i>	Valid	2009-02-02 16:52:56
<input type="checkbox"/>	Edit 157	commw.sis->'commwarrior.exe'		Classification successful	Valid	2009-02-02 16:50:49
<input type="checkbox"/>	Edit 156	commw.sis		<i>Analysis failed</i>	Valid	2009-02-02 16:50:49
<input type="checkbox"/>	Edit 155	commw.sis->'commwarrior.exe'		Classification	Valid	2009-02-02 16:50:49



Upload

Unpacking

Classification

Statistics

Families Files Tree

Item Id Sort direction: Descending Show 25 items per page

Enter your filter expression here (?) Refresh

- Item Id
- Item Name
- Item Description
- State
- Family Name
- Family Description
- MD5 Hash
- SHA1 Hash
- SHA256 Hash
- SHA512 Hash
- Packer Name
- Packer Description
- PE Dump
- Warnings
- PE State
- User
- Maximum steps
- Time Added
- Unpacking Started On
- Unpacking Finished On
- Unpacking Time
- Analysis Started On
- Analysis Finished On
- Analysis Time
- Classification Started On
- Classification Finished On
- Classification Time

previous 1 of 7 next

Download EXE Download Dump Examine Dump Download IDB Delete selected

<input type="checkbox"/>	Item Id	Item Name	Item Description	State	PE State	Time Added
<input type="checkbox"/>	Edit 160	unknown_executable.sis->'.flo.mdl'		Classification successful	Valid	2009-02-02 16:52:56
<input type="checkbox"/>	Edit 159	unknown_executable.sis->'.ni.ai-.app'		Classification successful	Valid	2009-02-02 16:52:56
<input type="checkbox"/>	Edit 158	unknown_executable.sis		Analysis failed	Valid	2009-02-02 16:52:56
<input type="checkbox"/>	Edit 157	commw.sis->'commwarrior.exe'		Classification successful	Valid	2009-02-02 16:50:49
<input type="checkbox"/>	Edit 156	commw.sis		Analysis failed	Valid	2009-02-02 16:50:49
<input type="checkbox"/>	Edit 155	commw.sis->'commwarrior.exe'		Classification successful	Valid	2009-02-02 16:50:49



Upload

Unpacking

Classification

Statistics

Families


Files

Tree



Search

Regular expression Case sensitive



- New_family_for_item_cacecc
- Cabir.C.SIS->'..ni.ai-.app'
- Cabir.A.sis->'..caribe.a
- Cabir.B.v2.sis->'C:.DC
- Cabir.B.sis->'..caribe.a
- Cabir.C.SIS->'..ni.ai-.a
- Cabir.E.SIS->'..[YUAN]
- Cabir.E.SIS->'..[YUAN]
- Cabir.F.sis->'..skulls.a
- Cabir.G.SIS->'..Tee22
- Cabir.M.sis->'..free\$8.
- Cabir.T_IloveU.sis->'
- Doomboot.B.sis->'C:.I
- Doomboot.C.sis->'C:.I
- Doomboot.C.sis->'C:.I
- Doomboot.C.sis->'C:.I


60%



Upload Unpacking **Classification** Statistics

Families Files **Tree**

Search Regular expressions



- New_family_for_item_cacecc
- Cabir.C.SIS->!.ni.ai-.app'2
- Cabir.A.sis->!.caribe.a
- Cabir.B.v2.sis->'C:.DOC
- Cabir.B.sis->!.caribe.a
- Cabir.C.SIS->!.ni.ai-.a
- Cabir.E.SIS->!.YUAN
- Cabir.E.SIS->!.YUAN
- Cabir.F.sis->!.skulls.a
- Cabir.G.SIS->!.Tee22
- Cabir.M.sis->!.free\$8.
- Cabir.T_ILoveU.sis->'
- Doomboot.B.sis->'C:.D
- Doomboot.C.sis->'C:.I
- Doomboot.C.sis->'C:.I
- Doomboot.C.sis->'C:.I

Cabir.C.SIS->!.ni.ai-.app'2

- unknown_executable.sis->!.ni.ai-.app'159
- Skudoo.B.sis->'C:.DOCUME~1.Maveric.LOCALS~1.Temp.MKS0.OIDI500.app'132
- Skudoo.A.sis->'C:.DOCUME~1.Maveric.LOCALS~1.Temp.MKS0.OIDI500.app'129
- Skudoo.A.sis->'C:.DOCUME~1.Maveric.LOCALS~1.Temp.MKS0.free\$8.APP'126
- CARIBE.SIS->!.caribe.app'122
- Doomboot.C.sis->'C:.DOCUME~1.TOMMYL~1.LOKALE~1.Temp.MKS0.ILoveU.APP'90
- Doomboot.C.sis->'C:.DOCUME~1.TOMMYL~1.LOKALE~1.Temp.MKS0.OIDI500.app'82
- Doomboot.C.sis->'C:.DOCUME~1.TOMMYL~1.LOKALE~1.Temp.MKS0.Tee222.app'72
- Doomboot.B.sis->'C:.DOCUME~1.Maveric.LOCALS~1.Temp.MKS0.OIDI500.app'67
- Cabir.T_ILoveU.sis->'C:.DOCUME~1.Nawras.LOCALS~1.Temp.MKS0.ILoveU.APP'52
- Cabir.M.sis->!.free\$8.app'38
- Cabir.G.SIS->!.Tee222.app'34

lass

Unpacking

Classification


Statistics

Families


Files

Tree

Search Regular




Multi-User capability




- Web-based
- Log in via username/password or SSL certificates
- Automation: Interaction via XMLRPC

Multi-User capability



- Different users can upload samples
- Three levels of permissions:
 - ▣ **Public:** All users can download the sample
 - ▣ **Protected:** All users can see, but not download the sample
 - ▣ **Private:** No other users can see the sample


Business Case



Basic scenario:

- Recognize new malware variants
- Limit risk of outbreak
- Low-cost
- Fast response time


Business Case



Advanced scenario (with shared samples):

- Neighborhood watch
 - ▣ Who else has seen this before ?
 - ▣ Where ?
 - ▣ When ?
 - ▣ Who should I talk to ?
- Improve communication


Pricing



Telco-Style: Base Fee + Volume


- Basic:
 - 200 € / month
 - 50 € per uploaded executable
- Medium:
 - 500 € / month
 - 10 uploads included, 30 € each afterwards
- Flat rate:
 - 999 € / month
 - No volume fee*

Pricing



- Only available to GSMA members
- The basic and medium packages may be shared between business entities


Pricing



This includes

- Providing the server / service
- Backups
- Email support


Roadmap



We will watch and adapt to new threats

- Windows Mobile Executables
- Of current relevance: .pyc
- Widgets
- iPhone executables
- Android

Summary



- We provide strong methods that identify malware variants
- Cheap, Fast, Accurate
- Any questions ?

Contact us !
info@zynamics.com